In the paper “Climate Policy Must Favour Mitigation Over Adaptation”, I develop the argument that the world must prefer mitigation to adaptation at the global level. The argument rests on the observation that mitigation is a public good while adaptation is a private one. I have the feeling that the academic literature has completely missed this point, and especially the representative agent literature, but also integrated assessment models that introduce adaptation and mitigation.
Read on for more details, why I have trouble to get this published in a journal, the referees’ comments and my rebuffals.
I have a new working paper which is joint work with Fabien Prieur (see further information below) who just accepted a professor position at the University of Nanterre in Paris, France. Our paper is entitled “[t]he role of conflict for optimal climate and immigration policy”, and we show the following:
In this article we investigate the role that internal and external conflict plays for optimal climate and immigration policy. Reviewing the empirical literature, we put forward five theses regarding the link between climate change, migration, and conflict. Based on these theses, we then develop a theoretical model in which we take the perspective of the North who unilaterally chooses the number of immigrants from a pool of potential migrants that is endogenously determined by the extent of climate change. Accepting these migrants allows increases in local production which not only increases climate change but also gives rise to internal conflicts. In addition, those potential migrants that want to move due to climate change but that are not allowed to immigrate may induce external conflict. While we show that the external and internal conflict play a significant yet decisively different role, it is the co-existence of both conflicts that makes policy making difficult. Considering only one conflict induces significant immigration but no mitigation. Allowing for both types of conflict, then depending on parameters, either a steady state without immigration but with mitigation will be optimal, or a steady state with a larger number of immigrants but less mitigation. Furthermore, we find the possibility of Skiba points, signaling that optimal policy depends on initial conditions, too. During transition we examine the substitutability and complementarity between the mitigation and immigration policy.
You can find the full paper HERE. In a post during the next days I hope to write a more policy-oriented view of this topic.
Some information on my co-author:
Fabien Prieur held a professor position at the University of Montpellier but has now accepted a professor position at the University of Nanterre. Fabien also holds a visiting position at Toulouse School of Economics. He is a researcher in environmental and resource economics and has published, among others, in journals such as the European Economic Review, Economic Theory, and Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. If you google his images then he is the guy with the beard and glasses, not the one with the gold chain and the beers…
I have a new working paper which clearly shows that a policy maker who evaluates mankind’s well-being would fully favour mitigation over adaptation. In fact, the result is that a policy maker should not invest in adaptation, because this may reduce global well-being significantly. If you want to know more, please do read on.